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SUPPLEMENTS TO TRIAL: A COURT
ADMINISTRATOR'S VIEW
PAUL NEJELSKIt
I. INTRODUCTION
M UCH of the traditional literature and programming, including
i the title of this symposium, incorrectly speak in terms of "alter-
natives" to court adjudication of disputes.
Many of the so-called "alternatives" to courts actually take place
in or under the auspices of a court. Examples of such alternatives
include the Philadelphia state and federal court annexed-arbitration
programsI and the summary jury trial developed by Judge Lambros
in Cleveland.2 Both of these types of alternatives involve cases that
have been filed in court and that take place in a courtroom or under
court adopted rules.3 Most of the programs referred to as alternatives to
courts are actually alternatives tofull-scale trials.4 Thus, rather than a black
or white choice of resolving a dispute in court or out of court, the
scene should be viewed as existing with varying degrees of court
involvement.
Before discussing the alternatives to courts, it is useful to more
clearly delineate the role courts are expected to serve in contemporary
society. 5 For example, Professor Martin Shapiro has stated that
"[s]tudents of courts have generally employed an ideal type, or really
a prototype, of courts involving (1) an independent judge applying
(2) pre-existing legal norms after (3) adversary proceedings in order to
t Court Administrator, United States Tax Court. B.A., Yale College, 1959;
J.D., Yale Law School, 1962. The author served as Circuit Executive for the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit from 1981 to 1984. The views ex-
pressed in this article are those of the author; they do not necessarily reflect the opin-
ions of present or former employers.
1. See Doty, Philadelphia's Comfpulsogy Arbitration Program, 29 Vill. L. Rev. 1449
(1984); Nejelski & Zeldin, Court-Annexed Arbitration in the Federal Courts.- The Philadel-
phia Stog, 42 MD. L. REV. 787 (1983).
2. See Lambros, The Judge's Role in Fostering Volunta.y Settlements, 29 VILL. L. REV.
1363 (1984).
3. For a discussion of how court-annexed arbitration works in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, see Nejelski & Zeldin, supra note 1, at 801. For a discussion of
the Lambros Summary Jury Trial, see Lambros, supra note 2, at 1373-78.
4. See, e.g., Doty, supra note 1; Lambros, supra note 2.
5. See generally COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF THE COURTS, THE ROLE OF THE
COURTS 1N AMERICAN SOCIETY U. Lieberman ed. 1984); J. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIG-
IOUS SOCIETY (1981); M. SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS (1981).
(1339)
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achieve (4) a dichotomous decision in which one of the parties was
assigned the legal right and the other found wrong."'6 Professor Sha-
piro goes on to note that, contrary to popular wisdom, "if we examine
what we generally call courts across the full range of contemporary
and historical societies, the prototype fits almost none of them."'7 Ac-
cording to Shapiro, this is because in reality there are few if any socie-
ties in which courts are so clearly delineated as to create absolute
boundaries between them and other aspects of the political system. 8
My experience as a court administrator parallels Shapiro's aca-
demic observation that judges and courts "are simply at one end of a
spectrum rather than constituting an absolutely distinct entity."9 A
recent example of the compatability of litigation and a "litigation al-
ternative or supplement," such as mediation, in the same dispute can
be found in the resolution of the dispute between Franklin Computer
Corporation and Apple Computer, Inc.' 0 Apple sued Franklin in
1982 for copyright infringement involving a look-alike version of Ap-
ple's top-selling program. After the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit decided that operative programs built into a computer chip
were eligible for copyright protection, Franklin settled the case for
$2.5 million. As part of the settlement agreement the parties agreed
to use an independent mediation-rather than legal action-to re-
solve any future disputes. "
I prefer to view these so-called "alternatives" as supplements and
complements to a full judicial resolution of the dispute. For example,
6. M. SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 1.
7. Id
8. Id Shapiro has noted that the common law "consistently converts indivisible
disputes, that is, disputes over injury to person and property and disputes over the
fulfillment or nonfulfillment of obligations into disputes over sums of money." Id at
10. He also recognized that mediated solutions are always possible in disputes about
money. Id With respect to equitable remedies, Shapiro notes that Anglo-American
law has developed equity as a means of resolving conflicts through remedies other
than money damages, i.e., by ordering someone to do something rather than pay
someone, and as such invokes the doctrine of "balancing of equities." Id For Sha-
piro, it is "below the facade of a dichotomous solution" presented by Anglo-Ameri-
can courts that the potential for mediation exists. Id
9. Id at 8. Shapiro suggests that while courts are clearly the least consensual
and the most coercive of conflict resolving institutions, courts have unnecessarily
been isolated from other styles of conflict resolution. Id Shapiro attributes this mis-
perception to the heavy emphasis on the conventional prototype of courts and on
their coercive aspects. Id In reality, according to Shapiro, courts are similar to other
means of conflict resolution in that they all "share the need to elicit consent." d.
10. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984), noted in Thrd Circuit Revuiw, 29 VILL. L.
REV. 894 (1984).
11. Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1984, at 10, col. 1.
1340 [Vol. 29: p. 1339
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the title "court-annexed" arbitration 12 emphasizes the supplemental
nature of the program, rather than indicating an alternative to a
court.
13
Too often, there has been an unfortunate competition in ideol-
ogy, personalities, and funding involving persons "inside" the courts
such as judges or family services directors versus persons "outside"
such as academics and program directors. Each group attempts to
improve its own image by putting down the other-e.g., "we need
this alternative because the courts don't work" or "alternatives are
illegal because they usurp the jurisdiction of the court." Each group
treats these programs as though they are involved in a zero sum
game-i.e., if they win, we lose. Such may be the case on occasion
when both sides are competing for tax or foundation dollars. This
article, however, will attempt to show that this ongoing struggle
should end. The term "supplement" to trial has been selected as an
attempt to find a middle ground.
The following remarks are intended to suggest that this basic dif-
ference in approach is more than a semantic one. The distinction
between whether a program for dispute resolution is a supplement or
an alternative to the existing legal framework will have an important
impact on such areas as program funding, its philosophy, and how
the client views the program.
In terms of funding, long term happiness for program directors
will not be found in attempting to strengthen their position by deni-
grating the courts, but by having their programs become a line item
in a state or federal government's annual budget-generally in the
judicial branch itself.
Philosophically, these supplements often apply the rule of law-
what a court would do in the same case. As Shapiro notes, both often
apply a combination of law and equity. To the extent that partici-
pants are "bargaining in the shadow of the law," 14 they are close ad-
juncts of courts. There is, hopefully, a ripple effect-lawyers settle in,
out, or on the fringes of courts based on how recent similar cases were
resolved when tried to a court or a jury. Many of these supplements
12. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
13. The term "court-annexed arbitration" apparently was conceived, or at least
popularized, by Assistant Attorney General Daniel J. Meador in 1977. See Nejelski &
Zeldin, supra note 1, at 787 n.2.
14. The phrase "bargaining in the shadow of the law" has been used to describe
how the legal system, through entitlements created by law, the costs and risks of
litigation, and the probable outcome in court if the case is litigated, affects negotia-
tions held outside the courtroom. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargainbng in the
Shadow of the Law. The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). For further discussion
of this concept, see note 64 and accompanying text infra.
1983-841 1341
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are really doomsday devices providing a mechanism or framework to
induce settlement. 15
From the client's perspective, the use of the term "alternative"
implies a second class system, designed to get the "junk" out of court.
Are alternatives being created for "other people"-often non-white
or poor? Serious due process and equal protection problems are
raised when programs in fact progress along a continuum from media-
tion and arbitration to "cheap adjudication,"' 6 becoming increas-
ingly compulsory and binding on the parties, while in name still
sounding voluntary and nonbinding.
Court administrators have a special interest in supplements to
courts and trial for several reasons. First, supplements are a force for
innovation and change. For example, the Bronx juvenile project and
the neighbor centers have demonstrated an ability to bring minorities
in to supplement extended bureaucracies of all white males.' 7 Sup-
plements provide competition with an often hard to change bureau-
cracy by providing services normally provided by the government.
Second, once the courts have created supplements, there is an inher-
ent obligation to provide for monitoring and review which may be
performed, or at least paid for, by court administrators.' 8 Third, the
office of court administrator is often a focal point for groups in and
outside the judiciary, such as interest groups or legislators, seeking to
start new programs or modify existing ones.' 9 Finally, supplements
provide fresh insights in thinking about the form and content of
courts.
20
While the focus in this article and the symposium is on civil
cases, criminal cases are also important for at least three reasons.
First, the emphasis in recent years on criminal cases exemplified by
15. See Bedlin & Nejelski, Unsettlhg Issues About Settlthg Civil Litigation, 68 JUDI-
CATURE 9 (1984).
16. M. SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 5.
17. See generally R. TOMASIC & M. FEELEY, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: AN As-
SESSMENT OF AN EMERGING IDEA (1982). Supplements also provide an opportunity
to bring specialists into a system which is normally composed of generalist judges.
For example, a fine arts expert may be appointed as an arbitrator or special master to
determine the value of art work.
18. Nejelski & La Pook, Moniton'g the Juvenile Justice System, 12 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 9 (1974).
19. Nejelski, Judging in a Democracy. The Tension of Popular Participaton, 61 JUDI-
CATURE 166, 175 (1977). "The court administrator must deal simultaneously with
the judiciary, executive, legislature, interest groups and the public. The administra-
tor acts as a liason for all. Serving as the judiciary's primary source of policy plan-
ning, the office of the administrator is the obvious place to press for reform." Id
20. For a discussion of neighborhood justice centers as a type of fresh insight, see
Wahrhaftig, Nonprofessional Conflct Resolution, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1463 (1984).
1342 [Vol. 29: p. 1339
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federal and state speedy trial legislation and constitutional decisions
has put civil cases on the back burner for courts, increasing the delay
inherent in noncriminal cases. Second, many of the same issues in-
volved in civil dispute supplements, such as due process and adminis-
trative feasibility, were presented by diversion from criminal and
juvenile courts in earlier decades. 2' Finally, the dividing line between
civil and criminal responses to the same problem may not be very
clear; for example, neighborhood justice centers may handle both.22
One warning: it is difficult to generalize about dispute resolu-
tion. For example, strategies and economics vary considerably from
personal injury cases to antitrust enforcement to divorce settlements
to consumer problems to arguments between neighbors. A strategy
which works in one type of dispute resolution may accomplish little or
even be counterproductive in another.
This article will address five propositions:
(1) the disputes outnumber the judges;
(2) supplements to trial have a long history;
(3) jurisdiction has moved in both directions between
courts and supplements;
(4) economic considerations are important but often over-
looked; and
(5) court reform is a political issue.
II. THE DISPUTES OUTNUMBER THE JUDGES
The University of Wisconsin spent two million dollars on a civil
litigation research project which began in 1978.23 That research
found a large funnel of disputes that "narrowed precipitously before
court action loomed:"
Only 1 in 10 people who started out with a grievance ever
made it to a lawyer. (The remaining 9 in 10 either swal-
lowed their problem or settled peacefully with the offending
store manager, landlord or neighbor.) . . . Half of those
who sought out a lawyer never actually filed suit-and of
21. See generally Nejelski, Diversion: The Promise and the Danger, 22 GRIME & DE-
LINQ. 393 (1976); Skoler, Protecting the Rights of Defendants in Pretrial Intervention Pro-
grams, 10 GRIM. LAW Bui.i.. 473 (1974).
22. See, e.g., R. ToMASIC & M. FEELEY, supra note 17, at 101 (neighborhood
justice centers handle interpersonal disputes referred by criminal court officials and
law enforcement officers, in addition to self-initiated civil cases).
23. Debunking Litigation Magic, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 21, 1983, at 98-99. See also
Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Cost of Ordinay Litigation, 31
UCLA L. REV. 72 (1983).
1983-84] 1343
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those who did, 92 percent settled without a trial. . . . In
short, only I in every 67 people with a grievance actually
pressed it to a final judicial resolution. 24
What strikes me about these figures is that there is enormous po-
tential for business for courts and their alternatives/supplements.
Only one of every ten grievances reaches the lawyer stage, only half of
those reach the courts. Consequently, the potential for formal and
informal dispute resolution clearly exceeds the present capacity.
Many potential cases are kept from court because of cost and delay.
Making the courts faster and cheaper will simply increase the volume
of litigation. Based on this data, alternatives or supplements will not
relieve the courts unless they resolve up to perhaps twenty times the
number of grievances currently in the courts.
What would happen if the number of courts were doubled over-
night? Would the judges have reduced caseloads? Perhaps not. To
some extent courts may be similar to roads-double the number of
lanes on the highway and you may simply double the number of cars
on the road, not reduce the congestion.
Many programs have been sold on the basis that they will reduce
the caseload of the courts-a proposition which the Wisconsin data
suggest is doubtful. There are simply more sponges being added to
soak up an increased number of disputes. These are disputes which
can now be brought because of a lower cost of litigation, because no
lawyers are involved and because the disputes are geographically
more accessible. In these instances, the question is not whether the
new program helps the courts (which will always be burdened), but
whether the program provides better service to clients.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has seen filings in-
crease 109% in the last ten years, with only a ten percent increase in
the number of active judges. As a result of this increase there has also
been a massive increase in the support staff in the United States
Courts of Appeals. 25
The court reformer's utopia has always been fast and inexpensive
litigation. I have seen the future, which we have now to some extent
24. NEWSWEEK, supra note 23, at 98. Interpretations of this data vary. Colum-
bia Law School Professor Maurice Rosenberg is quoted as commenting that the Wis-
consin researchers say "litigation isn't so bad because only 10 per cent get to suit. It's
just as easy for me to say that's a lot as for them to say it's a little." Id at 99.
25. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes." What We Know and Don't Know
(And Think We Know) About Our Allegedy Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 4, 36 (1983).
1344 [Vol. 29: p. 1339
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in pro se petitions filed by prisoners, usually at no cost to themselves.
This future does not work.
The number of these petitions is staggering; they have been the
cause of a large proportion of the dramatic increase in federal court
filings during the last two decades. Most of these suits are expensive
therapy for the prisoners: expensive to society, not to the prisoner,
who can simply file another suit as soon as-or even before-the last
petition has been dismissed.
There are basically two types of prisoner cases. Some challenge
the underlying conviction; others complain of the conditions of con-
finement. There have been a number of proposals to unify those
which attack the conviction, but little progress has been made. 26 At
one time, there were hopes that mediation of prisoner complaints
about the conditions of confinement might be a useful alternative.2 7
But several experiments have ended in failure.2 8 The answer may lie
in charging the inmates for the privilege of bringing frivolous suits29
or in issuing injunctions.3 0
26. One such proposal provides for a National Court of Criminal Appeals,
which would hear and decide all criminal appeals from the United States District
Courts and any state criminal cases involving federal questions. See Meador, The
FederalJudtciagy--Infiation, Malfunction, and a Proposed Course of Action, 1981 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 630.
27. One such attempt has been the Maryland Mediation Project, which pro-
vides for mediation services for prisoner complaints. See Reynolds & Tonry, Profes-
sional Mediation Servicesfor Prisoners' Complaints, 67 A.B.A. J. 294 (1981). The project
was developed to accommodate those prisoners' complaints which needed immediate
attention, such as allegations of guard brutality or deprivation of medical care. Id
The goal of the program was the avoidance of the typical two year wait for trial of
the complaint. Id.
28. One such experiment was conducted at the Federal Correctional Institution
in Danbury, Connecticut, where inmates had access to a mediator. For a discussion
of this experiment, see Cole, Hanson & Silbert, Mediation: Is It an Eective Alternative to
Adjudication in Resolving Prtoner Complaints?, 65 JUDICATURE 481 (1982).
29. To discourage frivolous suits, one Illinois district court judge has set a rule
requiring that inmates who file suits which allege civil rights violations pay four or
five dollars as "upfront money." N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1984, at 39, col. 1. In the past
year, the number of lawsuits by inmates has decreased from about 400 to 233 as a
result of this new rule, combined with a computer system that keeps closer track of
the cases. Id. See generally T. WILLGING, PARTIAL PAYMENT OF FILING FEES IN PRIS-
ONER IN FORMA PAUPERIS CASES IN FEDERAL COURTS: A PRELIMINARY REPORT
(1984) (available from Federal Judical Center).
30. See In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443 (3rd Cir. 1982). The Third Circuit has held
that a court has the power to restrict an individual from filing complaints where the
litigant files numerous repetitive, malicious or frivolous complaints. Id at 445-46. See
also Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075 (1st Cir. 1980) (repetitive and vague com-
plaints), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980); Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.
1983); Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1087
(1981). However, access to the courts is a fundamental tenet of our judicial system,
and thus mere litigiousness is not enough to support an injunction against the filing
of further complaints. See Oliver, 682 F.2d at 446.
1983-84] 1345
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In short, the answer may be to reintroduce costs into the system.
Free dispute resolution systems have been and will continue to be
abused. If the courts have been wounded, much of the damage has
been self-inflicted.3 1
The large pool of disputes which can go to court (and to supple-
ments) is important for several reasons which have particular imme-
diacy to court administrators.
First, funds for courts are always in short supply. Other constitu-
encies-business, labor, the poor-are larger and better organized
than the courts. And they vote. As a consequence of the inherent
hostility between branches of government, legislatures and executive
agencies are stingy toward the courts. The courts are accused of med-
dling in politics. They declare statutes unconstitutional. School
prayer, racial integration, abortion-the variety of issues on which
the courts must rule ensures that virtually every segment of society is
offended by the courts at one time or another. Consequently, they
often seek retribution at budget time. The net effect is that courts are
always behind. As a practical matter they will not grow to meet the
needs of society; thus, increased service to the public will often come
through supplements.
Second, there are inherent limits on size. One inherent problem
of expansion is a loss of collegiality. Appellate courts of twenty and
thirty judges are increasingly common. For example, the recent addi-
tion of five judicial positions brought to twenty-seven the number of
active judges on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 32 Efforts to add
judges on the federal court of appeals level and the creation of more
circuits will result in more conflicts among the circuits. 33 Moreover,
additional judges may lead to too many opinions. For example, the
New Jersey Appellate Division in 1963 had three panels of nine
judges. Twenty years later there are nine panels consisting of a total
of twenty-seven judges. Do judges on such large appellate courts
have time to read each other's opinions? More opinions are being
made public due to growth of commercial and government services.
This proliferation of opinions has caused a breakdown of the rule of
law, because few judges have the time or resources to research and
understand this avalanche of paper.
31. For a discussion of some of the implications of this situation, see Part V infra.
32. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, § 201(a)(1), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & Al). NEws (98 Stat.) 346.
33. There has been a proposal for a fourth tier in the federal judiciary, namely
an "intercircuit tribunal." Currently there are over 200 federal courts.
1346 [Vol. 29: p. 1339
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The answer? As the next section demonstrates, society and the
courts have long relied on supplements.
III. SUPPLEMENTS TO TRIAL HAVE A LONG HISTORY
Trials and their complements have existed since the earliest re-
corded times. For example, in fourth century B.C. Athens, both trials
and arbitrations flourished side by side.34 In keeping with the par-
ticipatory democracy of that time and place, every Athenian citizen
at age fifty-nine spent-as a civic obligation-one year as an
arbitrator.
We have always resolved disputes through arbitration, mutual
friends, business associations, and church communities. Quotations
from the diary of Moreau de St. Mery, a Frenchman who lived for
several years in Philadelphia during the 1790's, illustrate this theme:
"There is a judge, but he only holds court for form's sake so that the
clerk, who is related to him, may earn a livelihood."3 5 Moreau re-
minds us that one reason for instituting supplements or alternatives to
trial is the unfortunate fact that those responsible for the formal jus-
tice system have generally been more concerned with living off the
courts than with improving the system and making it responsive to
society's needs.
The harsh judgment of history on lawyers, judges and politicians
is not confined to Moreau de St. Mery and the Eighteenth Century.
The following quotation concerning conditions in England from 1440
to 1640 has been repeated throughout history and has a strikingly
contemporary sound:
Lawyers have never been among the best loved members of
any community. Yet in the two centuries which preceded
the English Civil War, criticism of the legal profession was
particularly acute. The long tradition of social comment
(from More, Elyot and Starkey, through the great preachers
of the mid-sixteenth century, like Latimer or Lever, to the
moralists of Elizabeth's reign and the early seventeenth cen-
tury) anathematized the lawyers, while in more plebeian
vein, common proverb and ancient saw testified to their un-
popularity. The more cunning the lawyer, the higher his
fee, and inevitably the poor came off worst; delay after delay
ensured that the wealth of the client passed into the pocket
34. See D.M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 203-11 (1978);
Nejelski & Zeldin, supra note 1, at 789 n.9.
35. MOREAU DE ST. MERY'S AMERICAN JOURNEY [1793-17981 281 (K. Roberts
& A. Roberts trans. & ed. 1947).
1983-841 1347
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of his lawyer; judges, counsel, attorneys and court officials
could be corrupted by influence, intimidated by social pres-
sure or, quite simply, bribed-accusations such as these
were commonplace. The lawyer's calling was essentially
that of a parasite. 36
One reason that courts have had relatively little business relative
to the large number of disputes is that whenever possible, potential
litigants have solved their problems elsewhere. One example from
Moreau's diary is illustrative. In order to support himself and his
family, Moreau became a bookseller, printer and stationer. A dispute
arose between Moreau and his partner, Baron de la Roche, concern-
ing the ownership of a printing press which had just arrived from
England. The press was in the possession of the Baron, who was
threatening to sell it to one of Moreau's competitors. Moreau was in
despair. It might take months or even years to receive another press.
Did Moreau turn to the courts? No. The delay was intolerable.
The cost of hiring a lawyer was prohibitive. The outcome was not
clear in part because the popularity of a French alien was given to
chance. Would the judge be a federalist and against the damned
Jacobins? At the time of decision, might there be a surge of anti-
French sentiment because of some action by the government in Paris
or by its navy?
Though the Baron and Moreau came close to fighting a duel, a
supplement to trial prevailed. "We have friends," the Baron said,
"who can be our judges, and see that both of us fulfill our obliga-
tions!"'37 Moreau agreed, and within one month both sides accepted a
settlement.38
Historian Jerold S. Auerbach has traced the long tradition in
this country of one subset of supplements/alternatives, namely, com-
munity-based experiments for dispute resolution without lawyers. 39
Auerbach finds that every society has a tension between formal legal
institutions and their "alternatives": "It is important to understand
that dispute-settlement preferences are not ultimate choices, but shift-
ing commitments. '40
36. E.W. IVES, Social Change and the Law, in THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 1600-
1660, at 115 (1968).
37. MOREAU DE ST. MERY'S AMERICAN JOURNEY, supra note 35, at 196.
38. The partnership was dissolved, and the Baron was reimbursed for the print-
ing press, which Moreau received shortly thereafter. Id at 201.
39. SeeJ. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983). For a discussion of com-
munity-based legal services, see Wahrhaftig, supra note 19.
40. J. AUERBACH, supra note 39, at 7.
1348 [Vol. 29: p. 1339
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Historically, some methods for resolving disputes have been
more truly alternatives, relatively unrelated to the courts and lawyers.
Auerbach focuses on community-based systems which are self-defined
by religious, geographical, ethnic or commercial criteria. The Puri-
tan New England community of the seventeenth century was one
such community. Because tolerance was not a virtue in these commu-
nities, the options were "enforced harmony and open schism. Either
conflict was stifled or dissidents departed."' 4' This is a reflection of
the unified civil and religious community, the "Bible Common-
wealth," which the Puritans inhabited. 42
Auerbach cites with approval the widespread use of community-
based arbitration and mediation to resolve disputes not only in colo-
nial New England but also among Quakers in Pennsylvania 43 and the
Dutch in New Netherlands. 44 In all these communities, the sanction
for failure to abide by the decision of the group was banishment; for
example, in Pennsylvania, one became an ex-Friend. In New York,
dispute resolution was at the core of political power. Arbitration
helped to consolidate Dutch rule during this time "by concentrating
dispute settlement power in the hands of the Dutch elite who could
control conflict before it erupted in acrimonious litigation. '45
Auerbach laments factors which in later years caused the demise
of these unified communities: the pursuit of power and wealth 46 and
"individualism. '47 The Enlightenment of the eighteenth century is
seen as a particularly harmful force because it "sanctified" the ina-
lienable individual rights of liberty and property, thereby insuring
the ascendency of lawyers and the rule of law.48
According to Auerbach, American individualism and materialis-
tic greed make a permanent and growing commitment to litigation
inevitable. 49 "The problem," Professor Auerbach explained, "goes
beyond lawyers, who are creatures of American culture, not its cre-
41. Id at 20.
42. Id at 22. A 1640 dispute, involving the wife of a prominent Boston resident,
is illustrative. See id at 23-25. The dispute arose when she quarreled with a carpen-
ter about his fee for work in her house. When the woman refused to accept the
decision of several arbitrations, she was eventually excommunicated from the church
community.
43. See id at 28-31.
44. See id. at 31-32.
45. Id at 2. By retaining control of arbitration, the Dutch preserved their cul-
tural autonomy and self-government. Id
46. Id at 30.
47. Id. at 10.
48. Id at 45.
49. id at 10.
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ators. It is, ultimately, a question of values, translated into social
structure . . . .Armed with the sword of litigation, Americans can
wage ceaseless warfare against each other-and themselves. ' '50
In contrast, Jethro Lieberman provides the contemporary view
that litigiousness is not a signal of failure but a clarion of social
health:
For the willingness to go to court is a sign that we are not
going to the streets-the court of last resort. . . . We have
been a litigious nation as we have been an immigrant one.
Indeed, the two are related. . . . The great revolution of
the contentious American people has been the democratiz-
ing and deprofessionalizing of the judicial avenue of
redress.5'
At least some of the unhappiness over the litigious tendencies of
various groups in recent years springs from the realization that laws
are being enforced through the courts. "During the 1960's and 1970's
Congress began to entrust enforcement to private parties . . ., thus
upsetting the tacit compromise between grand declaration of legal
principle and silent failure to enforce."'52
Auerbach and Lieberman would agree that litigiousness is not a
legal but a social phenomenon. As Leiberman has noted, "it is born
of a breakdown in community, a breakdown that exacerbates and is
exacerbated by the growth of law."'5 3 Grant Gilmore succinctly
pointed out that "the better the society, the less law there will be. In
Heaven there will be no law. . . . In Hell there will be nothing but
law, and due process will be meticulously observed. ' 54
According to Lieberman, the courts have become the final repos-
itories of social trust, and they have sought to discharge their duty by
holding accountable those whose trust was not merited. 55 He suggests
that the growing complexity of our life and the spread of specialist
knowledge is making each of us more and more illiterate about the
way the world works, thereby making the work of the courts more
difficult. 56
Administrative law agencies and licensing are supplements
which far overshadow the courts in terms of volume, especially in ar-
50. Id at 13.
51. J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 5, at 7, 13, 17.
52. Id. at 182.
53. Id at 186.
54. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977).
55. J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 5, at 186.
56. Id
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eas of importance to the average citizen, such as motor vehicle
licenses or entrance into certain employment fields.
In labor, workmen's compensation systems and the National La-
bor Relations Board created whole new courts with specially ap-
pointed prolabor adjudicators to supplant judges in traditional courts
who had refused to apply the new laws. In other words, who adminis-
ters the law may be just as important as the letter of the law.
Throughout history, the formal trial in a court of general juris-
diction has been more the exception than the rule. Arguably, more
cases in the federal judicial system are resolved today by specialized
supplemental tribunals, magistrates and forfeiture of collateral pro-
grams than by United States district judges. These specialized courts
handle an impressive array and an enormous volume of cases. They
include such diverse and important areas as bankruptcy, claims
against the United States, international trade, military matters and
taxes. Similarly, in the state courts, more citizens come in contact
with traffic, divorce, juvenile, and small claims tribunals than with
the court of general trial jurisdiction. 57
Courts have certain advantages over most supplements/alterna-
tives, such as visibility and accountability. The checks and balances
inherent in the tension among the three branches of government pro-
vide a monitoring often lacking in supplemental programs.
Not all of these supplements have been viewed as positive contri-
butions. Anything less than the consideration of a claim by a general
jurisdiction court has been regarded by some clients as second class
justice. In addition, supplemental dispute resolvers and their staffs
want equality in pay, status, title and the other privileges enjoyed by
judges and their staffs. As a result of these factors, there is a constant
disequihbrium in creatig supplements to the extent that they become courts. Fi-
nally, many of these alternatives/supplements raise due process and
equal protection problems.5 They may be too removed from the
protections of traditional courts. For example, there is the danger
that administrative law judges in social security cases may be given
57. In this country, lawyers and law schools have traditionally overlooked these
supplements. However, Harvard Law School, which frequently blazes the trail in
legal education, has established courses on negotiation and dispute resolution. Under
the guidance of professors such as Roger Fisher and Frank Sander, there is also an
impressive program of applied research and dissemination through publication and
workshops. See Negotiation Newsletter, Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law
School, Fall 1983 (describing a score of workshops, visiting scholars, projects and
publications).
58. P. NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 198 (1969).
1983-841 1351
13
Nejelski: Supplements to Trial: A Court Administrator's View
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
quotas for denial of benefits based on the budgets and philosophies of
those running the agency.
IV. JURISDICTION HAS MOVED IN BOTH DIRECTIONS BETWEEN
COURTS AND SUPPLEMENTS
An example of this jurisdictional movement is the United States
Tax Court, which was created as an administrative board in 1924,
became a quasi-administrative agency, evolved into an independent
article I court by 1969, and may eventually reach article III status.
United States Magistrates were created as a separate tier in the fed-
eral hierarchy in 1968.59 Relegated to an almost steady diet of social
security claims and prisoner petitions, they now insist on wearing
black robes and being called "Your Honor." Created as an alterna-
tive to increasing the number of article III district court judges, it is
only a matter of time before magistrates lobby for and achieve the
pay status and requisites of "real" judges. In one district in the Third
Circuit, the magistrates were required by the district judges to wear
gray robes-to separate them from the "real" judges. But they soon
won the right to wear black robes.
At the state level, the creation of separate workmen's compensa-
tion tribunals was intended to result in faster, more informal trials.
But after two or three decades, they had the characteristics of courts
of general jurisdiction: delay, formalism, rules of evidence, black
robes for judges, etc.6°
The problem exists even where staff assistance may lead to the
creation of quasi-judicial and then judicial positions. The growth of
staff attorneys and settlement programs in the federal courts of ap-
peals may lead to the creation of appellate magistrates. The evolu-
tion of commissioners in state supreme courts, such as in Kansas, into
regular judges of the intermediate appellate court is one example of
appellate level adjuncts becoming full time judges.
The line between hearing officer and judge is a fine one and has
already been crossed in most federal administrative law systems. In
immigration cases, the "special inquiry officer" in the last decade has
become the "administrative law judge."'6 '
59. See Federal Magistrate Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, § 101, 82 Stat. 1113 (1968)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1982)).
60. Unfortunately, examples of the judicial caste system abound. Recent in-
stances include the unsuccessful struggle of federal bankruptcy judges to improve
their "inferior" status. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1984, at A16, col. 3.
61. Of course, the problems of status and the allegations that members of profes-
sions are more concerned with self interest than with service are not limited to the
legal and judicial professions. Moreau discovered two examples of such self-ag-
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An analogy to the availability of judicial alternatives is the ex-
tent to which individuals can use alternatives in the health care field.
Patients can attempt to treat themselves or receive assistance from
persons who are not licensed doctors, such as nurses or midwives, ar-
guably substituting roughly equivalent services at less cost and
greater convenience.
Many professions have begun using less formal or part-time sup-
plements. The armed forces make extensive use of national guard or
regular reservists whose numbers may exceed the soldiers or sailors on
active duty. The Roman Catholic Church has experienced a growth
in the role of the lay ministry, especially in the two decades since
Vatican II. Lay persons participate in various aspects of the liturgy,
educational programs and administration in ways unheard of twenty
years ago.
Although there are obviously differences in the use of alternative
or supplements in these professions, I would suggest that some similar
problems arise. These include the threat to the status and infallibility
of the professionals and the imposition of requirements that the lay
people become "professionalized" through mandatory formal educa-
tion requirements, training manuals, loyalty oaths, licensing and so
forth. When the professionals are "successful," they will have pro-
duced an alternative delivery system which is just as expensive, incon-
venient and resistant to change as the original doctor, bishop, general
or judge.
A serious problem is how to keep supplements in a flexible posi-
tion between the administrative formalism of a court and the creative
freedom of the less organized supplements. Frank Sander has pro-
posed a courthouse with many doors, with the hope that special pro-
gandizement during his journey: "At Philadelphia, a shoemaker for men would con-
sider himself debased if he worked for children. The captain of the ship Columbia, of
New York, told me his mate never ate with him, because eating together necessitates
conversation, and conversation leads to familiarity." MOREAU DE ST. MERY'S
AMERICAN JOURNEY, supra note 35, at 334.
One recent controversy in the medical profession involved a doctor who wrote a
column for a Connecticut newspaper. In one such column he wrote:
The M.D. degree permits the bearer to become a member of the Club. Of
course, once a doctor is a member of the Club, he has certain obligations:
He must refer constantly to how little money he has, yet live in a large and
well-manicured house; become pompous and arrogant but not speak badly
about his colleagues; make sure that "his" hospital is run for the benefit of
the doctors, not patients; not allow patient convenience to compromise his
own, and never write newspaper columns that criticize The Club.
Gott, Poughkeepsie Journal (quoted in N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1984, at B2, col. 4). Dr.
Gott is now the defendant in a complaint filed by a local medical society that wants
the doctor to stop writing "negative things about the medical profession." See N.Y.
Times, Feb. 10, 1984, at B2, col. 4.
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cedures could be tailormade for specific types of disputes.62
A basic question in dispute resolution is the use of coercion. 63 If
the dispute resolution program is voluntary, its probability of success
is doubtful. Generally, one side has what it wants: for example, the
property in question, physical custody of the child, the ability to play
a stereo at full volume. Why even respond to a summons? Why fol-
low the findings of the mediator or arbitrator?
The state's power in supplemental programs is generally present
only in the background. The parties are told to take the dispute reso-
lution system and this result, because something more inconvenient,
expensive, and/or onerous will be forced on them.6 4 However, it
should be noted that parties to a supplemental dispute resolution sys-
tem often bargain in the shadow of the law, and do not merely select
solutions randomly.65 In other words, "coercion" is allowed because
62. See Address by Frank E.A. Sander, 70 F.R.D. 111 (delivered at the National
Conference on the cause of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Jus-
tice, April 7-9, 1976). Sander suggests that by the year 2000, courthouses may be
replaced by "Dispute Resolution Center[s]." Id at 131. At the center, a complainant
would initially go to a "screening clerk," who would then direct him to the process
most appropriate to his case. Id Sander suggests that the lobby directory might look
as follows:
Screening Clerk Room 1
Mediation 2
Arbitration 3
Fact finding 4
Malpractice Screening Panel 5
Superior Court 6
Ombudsman 7
Id.
63. A refugee from the anarchy which characterized much of revolutionary
France in the early 1790's, Moreau was acutely sensitive to situations where might
makes right:
If we dared go out of Philadelphia and glance at those who live far in the
country in sections that are remote, though in the same province, we would
say that Americans who live there have neither justice nor public security.
If a person buys land, one is apt to find that someone has already seized it
and established himself upon it. If you try to make him abandon it, a gun-
shot may stop you, and none will be interested in avenging you.
MOREAU DE ST. MERY's AMERICAN JOURNEY, supra note 35, at 280-81.
64. A recent newspaper description of mediation of child custody cases in Penn-
sylvania illustrates the point. Chester County Custody Conciliator Bill Kraut de-
scribed the process by which an independent therapist's report becomes part of the
court record, and noted that "if [the parties] don't settle their differences, a judge will
make the decision for them." Kraut called the process "conciliation by intimida-
tion." See Phila. Inquirer, Jan. 29, 1984, at IW, col. 1. This coercion is allowed
because Kraut and the attorneys know the "going rate" for various fact patterns, i.e.,
what happened in similar cases which either went before a judge or were resolved
more informally.
65. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 14, at 986. It has been suggested that
lawyers negotiating settlements proceed in an adjudicatory manner in which "rules,
precedents, and reasoned elaboration . . . may be expected to determine outcomes."
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supplements of the court follow the rule of law and do not simply
exercise their unbridled discretion.
What responsibilities do government, and in particular the
courts, have for the resolution of disputes in society? Supplements are
most acceptable if law is followed. As Lord Coke emphasized, the
importance of the common law to society should be reflected by the
measuring of individual obligations and rights "by the golden and
straight mete-wand of the law, and not the uncertain and crooked
cord of discretion." 66
The history of the Cuban popular tribunals from 1962 to the
present strongly suggests that similar forces may be at work in other
countries.67 In the early years of the Cuban revolution, the tradi-
tional legal system was discredited and its participants exiled. Law-
yers and judges had no institutionalized role in the newly created
popular courts. The part-time judges were workers who were consid-
ered to have the right background and political orientation. These
workers received rigorous training. The courts were created outside
the Ministry of Justice and given broad jurisdiction, including minor
torts and criminal offenses, health matters, juvenile delinquency, land
distribution and personal quarrels. To maximize attendance, trials
were held in the evenings and in public places. 68 Innovative sanc-
tions were applied, such as sentences to attend neighborhood "study
circles."
There were only thirty-five such courts in 1964, but by 1969
about 8,000 judges in more than 2,000 courts heard cases throughout
the island. But forces for formalism had come early in the movement.
By the fourth year of the popular courts, a judge's manual had been
distributed. By 1973, regulations were enacted restricting places in
which trials could be held and emphasizing the formality of judicial
proceedings. Innovative sanctions gave way to more traditional fines.
Members of the bar and the judiciary were required to be part of the
panel. Courtrooms are now more formal and trials are no longer held
in public places or work centers. The judges now wear suits and
Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89
HARV. L. REV. 638 (1976).
66. E.W. IvEs, supra note 36, at 125.
67. See generally Sulas, The Emergence and Decline of the Cuban Popular Tribunals, 17
LAw & Soc. REV. 587 (1983). Popular courts were first proposed for Cuba by Fidel
Castro in 1962, in the wake of the 1959 Communist revolution. Id
68. The purpose of the trials was not primarily to determine guilt or innocence.
Rather, they were "regarded as tools which through embarrassment and peer pres-
sure helped rehabilitate offenders and deter others." Id at 590-91. Spectators played
a vital role in the educational process by participating and expressing their opinions.
Id.
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traditional robes instead of work clothes as before. Formerly a free-
standing institution, the popular courts now find themselves at the
bottom rung of a unified pyramid-shaped court system.
The current municipal courts in Cuba are certainly different
from both their prerevolutionary counterparts and the popular courts
of the 1960's. There is still considerably more lay participation in the
panel of judges (two of the three members are currently lay persons).
Some innovations in sanctioning remain (e.g., fines based on so many
days of a defendant's earnings rather than a fixed sum). A new gener-
ation of legal professionals had been trained and indoctrinated: po-
lice, judges, lawyers, as well as lay judges.
But clearly, the left swing of the 1960's revolution had seen many
Thermadorian, counterrevolutionary changes: manuals of procedure,
published regulations and rules, formal procedures characterized by
the wearing of robes, emphasis on factfinding as opposed to education
and show trials, direct links to the next tier of courts in a structured
hierarchial model of administration, and limited discretion in the
judges, especially in sanctioning.69
V. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS: IMPORTANT BUT
OFTEN OVERLOOKED
Economic issues of special interest to court administrators in-
clude these questions: Are supplements cost effective? Will supple-
ments encourage cases for the wrong reasons? How much cost to
litigants is acceptable? To what extent should courts be self-sus-
taining? Is cheaper necessarily inferior?
With more than ninety percent of litigation being withdrawn,
decided, or settled before trial, serious questions are raised and should
be answered concerning whether the cost of a new program outweighs
the benefits derived. The problem is compounded by the fact that
these costs and benefits are hard to measure and to compare. For
example, is the cost to society of a court-annexed arbitration program
justified when the same number of cases go to trial, but the cases
which settle are resolved much earlier and at less cost to the litigants?
Supplements like the civil appeals management programs
(CAMPS) in several federal courts of appeals may encourage a liti-
gant to take an appeal which would not have been feasible before
because of high cost and delay. Does society (or the parties) benefit
69. The initial success and later failure of the popular court experiment was
closely tied to long-term economic and political goals of the communist government,
and in particular, the need for an institutionalized bureaucratic cadre to operate the
judicial system. Id. at 607.
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from a quick, inexpensive review of a hard-won judgement at the trial
level? The problem is particularly acute if the parajudge's role is only
to "split the difference" or compromise the verdict, rather than to
apply the rule of law.
At each stage of dispute resolution, economic costs are (or at least
can be) placed on the parties. To what extent should these costs be
manipulated to change the flow of litigation? For instance, should
the filing fees required to commence a legal action be raised or low-
ered? Will legal assistance be provided to certain groups? Will "pen-
alties" be assessed: for example, will attorney's fees be awarded?
Society measures the economic pain which dispute resolution will cost
the parties, and supplements are no exception.
Since Tumey v. OhiJo,70 it has not been permissible for judges to
receive their salaries directly from the litigants in the form of filing
fees or fines. But every legislature (and consequently every court ad-
ministrator) looks at the revenue produced by a court. To what ex-
tent does or should a court supply revenue to offset its expenses?
These issues are also pertinent for supplements: to what extent can
they be self-sustaining?
Another concern directly affecting the administration of these
programs is the perception, real or imagined, that these supplements
are in some ways inferior to the normal court processes. Some groups
may oppose supplements because they are thought to be inferior or
second class. The creators and administrators of these programs carry
a special burden in insuring that supplements in fact meet the goals
of effective justice.
Many citizens are denied access to the courts because of high
costs. 7' With partners in larger firms charging $200 per hour, it does
not take long to make legal services and litigation beyond the reach of
most Americans. But, paradoxically, there are too many lawyers-
600,000 and growing. The pretrial discovery industry has blossomed.
The going rate for handling a case through a jury trial in state court
is $10,000; in federal court, the figure reaches $50,000.
Indeed, the costs of litigation can be staggering. In a celebrated
antitrust case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a district court
70. 273 U.S. 510 (1927). In Tumee, the United States Supreme Court held that
the defendant had been deprived of his constitutional right to due process when he
was subjected to a trial by a mayor whose sole source of fees he could collect was the
fine imposed on the defendant if convicted. Id. at 523.
71. Even in Moreau's day, he discovered that in Philadelphia, "[t]he[] outstand-
ing men are lawyers whose profession is even more lucrative than in England. Their
salaries are excessive." MOREAU DE ST. MERY's AMERICAN JOURNEY, supra note 36,
at 335.
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judge cut attorneys' fees from $20.2 million to $4.3 million. The dis-
trict court's 468 page opinion found the fees "grossly excessive."' 72 Af-
ter handling a civil rights case last year, Harvard Law Professor
Lawrence Tribe submitted a bill to the state of Massachusetts for
$332,441.73 In addition to his hourly fee of $275, Tribe gave himself a
50% bonus for winning.7 4 The district court awarded Professor Tribe
over $176,000, but the First Circuit reduced the fee award to less than
$82,000. 75
A former president of the New York Federal Bar Council, Peter
Megargee Brown, summarized the problem recently. According to
Brown, the American legal profession is declining because "profes-
sional success today is measured by profits. There is plain greed on
the part of lawyers."' 76 Brown concludes that "non-lawyers will in-
creasingly fill voids in the legal system and take away larger portions
of lawyers' traditional rewards and perquisites. '77
The bar has ambivolent feelings about some supplements, such
as neighborhood justice centers. The central question is: do they re-
duce lawyer income? Supplements present important ethical consid-
erations for lawyers, especially where the interests of a client and
lawyer may diverge. For example, would a client be better off settling
a case or using a low cost supplement rather than going through ex-
pensive litigation and trial, which may be very financially rewarding
to the lawyer?
Other important economic problems include the positive aspect
of litigation or dispute resolution expense: (1) fee shifting-does or
should the loser deserve a "free ride"?; and (2) do we really want a
72. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, 68 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The
court also criticized counsel for "duplication, waste, and gross inefficiency," and
noted that the case had given substance to the criticism that class action suits are
being manipulated by lawyers to generate fees. Id at 83, 85.
73. Professor Tribe represented a restaurant seeking a liquor license in its chal-
lenge to a state statute giving nearby churches the right to veto such requests. See
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982). Tribe, however, had kept few
records. When questioned about his fees, Tribe called the need to substantiate the
number of hours he claims to have spent "a stupid waste of time." See N.Y. Times,
Dec. 14, 1983, at A22, col. 1.
74. The Washington Post commented on Tribe's bill in an editorial: "High-
priced lawyers are just charging much too much-to the point of caricature." Wash.
Post, Dec. 16, 1983, at A22, col. 1. The Post thought that Professor Tribe's claim
"reveals elements of a gigantic rip-off." Id.
75. See Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945 (lst Cir. 1984).
76. N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1983, at A31, col. 1. Brown suggests that the law profes-
sion needs leadership, inspiration and a vigilant self-policing system to enforce its
own codes and rules. Id Even more importantly, according to Brown, young lawyers
should be taught to serve public interests as well as private interests. Id
77. Id
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no-cost-to-the-litigant system, such as we now have with prisoner
petitions?
Earlier this year, a United States district court judge in the
Southern District of New York assessed two plaintiffs $50 each and
their lawyer $19,000 in legal costs for filing a "meritless law suit." '78
The suit charged that a nonprofit organization in Manhattan assist-
ing victims of crime had discriminated on racial basis in dismissing
two employees. After a hearing, the judge found that there was no
evidence of racial discrimination. The judge held that
where there is no substantiating evidence, a court is justified
in determining that the complaint is meritless and unrea-
sonable . . . .The record amply demonstrates that counsel
is primarily responsible for the use of the judicial process
... . In bringing this baseless suit, [counsel] has wasted
my time and the time and money of the defendants. 79
Counsel, however, claimed: "This decision threatens every public-in-
terest, legal services and civil liberties practitioner." 80
Lawyers and the organized bar have attempted to monopolize
dispute resolution for their own personal gain. To the extent that
alternatives/supplements provide competition which lower the costs
to the consumer, they should be encouraged.
How long will the courts and the legal profession condone litiga-
tion abuses? The New York Times recently reported the following
scene from the asbestos litigation wars: "Yesterday, for the first time,
one of the workers afflicted with an asbestos-related disease appeared
in court in Manhattan to argue that the lawyers were really repre-
senting themselves-and no one was speaking for the workers." 8 1
78. The agency successfully contended that the two were fired because they
were using drugs at work. See Santiago v. Victim Serv. Agency, (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8,
1984), dzscussed in N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1984 at B9, col. 4, rev'don other grounds, No. 84-
7558 (2d Cir. Jan. 11, 1985). The Second Circuit reversed the district court's fee
award on the ground that having dismissed the action, the court no longer had juris-
diction over the case. See Santiago v. Victim Serv. Agency, No. 84-7558 (2d Cir. Jan.
11, 1985).
79. Id.
80. Id
81. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at D3, col. 5. The article noted that several
months previously, the attorneys for the asbestos claimants turned down a lump sum
settlement of $400 million (about $28,000 per claim) for pending claims. The law-
yers demanded over $700 million, the difference being approximately what it would
take to pay $400 million to the claimants and to give contingency fees to the lawyers.
Id.
A recent study by the Rand Corporation detailed the extent to which the asbes-
tos litigation process has benefitted the attorneys more than plaintiffs. See J.
KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER & M. SHANLEY, COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGA-
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Can it be any surprise that supplements to litigation are being devel-
oped to counter the Olympian appetites of American lawyers for their
fellow citizens' gold?
Perhaps the most significant development in reducing legal fees
and exploring supplements has been the creation of the Center for
Public Resources in New York City by leading corporations and in-
surance companies. The Center has served as a clearinghouse and
innovator in a time of general apathy by bench and bar. Perhaps
serious reform can come only from clients who have been gouged
once too often.
VI. COURT REFORM: A POLITICAL ISSUE
Ever since lawyers were outlawed in seventeenth century Massa-
chusetts Bay Colony,8 2 how disputes get resolved in this country has
been a classic political problem: who gets what, when, where and
how.
The tensions between traditional courts and alterna-
tives/supplements has hardly been limited to this country. Indeed,
the creation of separate courts of equity or prerogative writs in Eng-
land (and their eventual merger with law in this country) is a basic
story of our Anglo-American legal history.
The utilization of separate courts (for example, the Crown's use
of admiralty courts without juries to try smuggling cases just before
the American revolution) and the creation of separate administrative
agencies (for example, the NLRB for labor disputes) have been signif-
icant political strategies. The evolutionary relationship between such
alternatives or supplements and the court of general jurisdiction ap-
pears as a continuous process when seen from a historical
perspective.8 3
A possible stabilizing factor may be the creation of special divi-
sions of the court of general jurisdiction, a process fostered by the
ABA Standards of Judicial Administration. The key decisionmakers
are thereby kept in the mainstream of the judiciary. Separate proce-
dural rules and training can be provided. A central question is
whether judges can be rotated to and from these divisions (compare
the isolated status of bankruptcy judges with the ideal of judges tem-
TION (1983). Analyzing the more than one billion dollars in expenses incurred by
defendants and insurers since the early 1970's (including plaintiffs' compensation),
the study concluded that for every $2.71 in expenditures, litigation expenses totalled
$1.71, while plaintiffs received just $1.00. Id at viii.
82. See J. AUERBACH, supra note 37, at 27.
83. See generally Nejelski, The Jefjrsonian/Hamiltonian Duality: .4 Framework for Un-
derstanding Reforms in the Administration offjusice, 64 JUDICATURE 450 (1981).
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porarily assigned to juvenile divisions).84
VII. CONCLUSION
Dispute resolution is big business. The "law industry" in 1983
had an income of $38 billion-compared to $30 billion for hotels,
and $4 billion for movies.8 5 Salaries, prestige, schools-many people
and institutions will rise or fall depending on the future of supple-
ments to courts.
The Department of Commerce has forecast for the 1980's that by
the end of the decade there will be a 30% increase in lawyers. Com-
puter specialists will increase 61%. But at the top of the list are
paralegals, which are expected to increase 118%.86 The question is
whether the same trend will exist in dispute resolution: for every
judge added to the judicial system, will there be four additional
parajudges such as mediators, conciliators, and arbitrators?87
84. See B. FLICKER, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE: A SUMMARY AND
ANALYSIS 152 (2d ed. 1982) (discussing IJA-ABA Commission on Juvenile Justice
Standards, Court Organization & Administration Standard 2.1).
85. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1984, at D2, col. 1.
86. N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1984, at D19, col. 1.
87. See M. SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 5. Professor Shapiro lamented recent
developments:
Recently one of the favored tactics for relieving delay in the civil courts has
been the adoption of systems of compulsory arbitration in which suits in-
volving relatively small amounts of money are assigned to arbitrators rather
than tried before a judge. Such a system ts not really one of arbitration but one of
cheap judging. The arbitrator is expected to arrived at the same decision
under the same law as would a judge. The parties usually do not choose the
arbitrator. He uses simpler procedures and carries a lower overhead of
courtroom costs than a judge and thus handles more cases at smaller cost.
Such systems thus allow the appointment of a great many temporary judges
by avoiding constitutional, statutory, and budgetary limitations on formal
judicial appointments.
Id (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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